Iran's newly elected President Masoud Pezeshkian finds himself walking a tightrope, balancing internal crises with external pressures. Two recent reports paint a stark picture: on one hand, Pezeshkian warns of potential water shortages so severe that Tehran, a city of 20 million, might need to be evacuated. On the other, he vows that Iran won't be "humiliated" into abandoning its nuclear and missile programs under threat of military action. The question isn’t if these issues are related, but how deeply intertwined they are.
Pezeshkian directly links Iran's economic woes – high prices and inflation – to both government mismanagement and international sanctions. This isn't just political rhetoric; it’s a systems-level problem. Reduced rainfall (down roughly 40% below seasonal averages in Tehran) exacerbates existing problems, but the crisis stems from years of over-extraction and inefficient resource allocation. The Amir Kabir Dam, Tehran's largest reservoir, is reportedly at a mere 8% capacity. That’s not a drought; that’s a near-complete failure of water management.
And here’s the part that I find genuinely puzzling: if the situation is as dire as Pezeshkian claims, why haven't more drastic measures been taken sooner? Are the water shortages being used as leverage in negotiations, or is the government truly paralyzed by the scope of the problem?
Pezeshkian’s insistence on maintaining Iran's missile program, despite potential international repercussions, adds another layer of complexity. He frames it as a matter of national defense, a right not to be surrendered under duress. "We are willing to hold talks under international frameworks, but not if they say you can't have… the right to defend yourself (with missiles), or else we will bomb you," he stated.

But is this truly about defense, or is it about regional power projection? Iran's ballistic missiles, with a range of up to 2,000 km (1,200 miles), can reach Israel and other potential regional targets. Resources spent on missile development are resources not spent on infrastructure improvements, including those desperately needed to address the water crisis.
This raises a critical question: What's the opportunity cost of prioritizing military strength over basic necessities like water security? Is the Iranian public willing to endure potential evacuation and economic hardship to maintain its missile program?
The elephant in the room is, of course, the impact of international sanctions. Pezeshkian acknowledges that "limited financial resources mean projects remain unfinished." Sanctions restrict Iran's access to international markets, limiting its ability to import essential goods and technologies, including those related to water management. It's a classic catch-22: Iran needs international cooperation to solve its water crisis, but its insistence on maintaining its nuclear and missile programs makes such cooperation difficult, if not impossible.
The claim that the situation is unprecedented is questionable. Rama Habibi, head of production operations at Tehran Regional Water Company, said, "In the past 60 years, we have not experienced such low autumn rainfall in Tehran, and the current situation is unprecedented." While the rainfall might be at a historic low, it is important to remember that 60 years ago, the population of Tehran was significantly smaller. The increased demand due to population growth puts additional strain on water resources, making direct comparisons misleading.
Pezeshkian's predicament is a reflection of Iran's broader challenges: a struggling economy, environmental degradation, and social unrest, all compounded by international isolation. He's inherited a system on the brink, where the choices are increasingly stark. Can he navigate these competing pressures, or will Iran be forced to choose between its national pride and the basic needs of its people? It's a high-stakes gamble, and the odds aren't in his favor.